approach, identifying the difficulties with the case and focussing on applying limits to ratification. The difficulties raised by the case have been recognised by the Privy Council, 7 and it was rejected by the authors of the U.S. Restatement (Third) Agency. 8 Professor Tan, whose book, The Law of Agency, is reviewed in this issue, stated "[i]f the issue should arise for determination in Singapore, it is suggested that a Singapore court should consider not following Bolton Partners v Lambert". 9 The current author reached the same conclusion in relation to Scots law in The Law of Agency in Scotland. 10 Analysis of the Outer House decision in Gray should be made against this backdrop of collective concern over Bolton.
B. THE FACTS
The pursuer, Mr Gray, was the managing director of Braid Logistics (UK) Ltd, the defenders, under a contract of employment. The defenders are a wholly owned subsidiary of a parent company now known as "Braid Group (Holdings) Limited". The pursuer averred that certain other directors concocted a scheme to render him a "bad leaver" in terms of his contract of employment. The impact on him was the loss of benefits which would otherwise be payable to him on leaving his employment. In effect there would be a forced sale of his shareholding at a lower than market price. The defender's rights in relation to the pursuer's dismissal were governed by Clause 13.1 of his contract of employment. Broadly stated, dismissal could take place in the event of his material breach of the terms and conditions of his employment contract, or where he committed any act of gross misconduct or conduct which would, in the reasonable opinion of the Board, bring any company in the group into disrepute or prejudicially affect the interests of any company in the group. The Board was defined as the Board of Directors of the parent company, including any committee of the Board duly appointed by it. Clause 13.3 provided that the pursuer could be suspended on full pay for as long as necessary to carry out a proper investigation and to hold a disciplinary hearing. The contract also set out (in Clause 16) a Disciplinary and Grievance Procedure. This clause left the final decision on any issue to the Chairman of the Board, who at the time these events took place was, in fact, the pursuer. Andrew Watson purported to decide that disciplinary proceedings should be initiated against the pursuer. Shane Watson purported to conduct the disciplinary proceedings, deciding that the pursuer should be dismissed, and this fact was intimated to the pursuer by letter. All of this took place under protest by the pursuer. The pursuer's right to appeal was set out in a letter to him. He averred that he was never offered an Appeal Tribunal which was properly constituted in terms of his contract of employment.
The pursuer raised different proceedings in response to this sequence of events: a petition for judicial review of the decision and a reclaiming motion relating to a decision of the Lord Ordinary to grant interim orders. The Inner House held that the petition for judicial review should be dismissed. 12 The pursuer also raised a petition under sections 994 and 996
Companies Act 2006 in respect of the parent company, 13 and a reclaiming motion for the section 994 proceedings.
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C. DECISION (1) Implied Ratification
Given constraints of space, only issues relevant to agency law are considered here. The first issue discussed by Lord Bannatyne, namely the competency of the proceedings, will not be discussed. The first agency issue related to the dismissal of Mr Gray. It was argued on his behalf that the act of dismissal was performed without authority and was not properly ratified. This necessitated discussion of whether ratification had impliedly taken place.
Counsel for the defenders argued that there was 'multiple ratification' by the defenders by Bannatyne's view this argument was overstated. He characterised counsel's appearance as involving a presumption of authority to act which could be rebutted through leading evidence to the contrary. 16 Lord Bannatyne characterised the pursuer's position, not as challenging counsel's mandate, but rather as challenging the underlying basis of this part of the defender's defence to the action, namely, the foundation of the defence of implied ratification. 17 The challenge had not, in a sense, been met by the defenders, given that they had failed to provide any further details. Nor was it a problem that no challenge had been made by the pursuers in the context of the other litigation. This was the first occasion upon which reliance was placed upon implied ratification. 18 The pursuers were therefore entitled to make the challenge in this particular litigation. The defenders had not raised any issue of personal bar.
Moving to the substantive issues surrounding implied ratification, Lord Bannatyne indicated that in a context such as this (a dispute between shareholders and directors) where the Board is not unanimous, the will of the company is expressed through resolutions of the Board which are validly passed at regularly constituted meetings of the Board. The pursuer characterised what had happened as a case of factions meeting in private and agreeing to act in a particular way. This being the case, a valid Board Resolution was required in order to found the actings which the defenders relied on. It was not enough that generally things were done which were known to the Board and done with their consent.
Lord Bannatyne concluded that, in the absence of Board resolutions to show that the defenders validly instructed the line of defence relied on, he was not persuaded of the irrelevance of the pursuer's challenge. 19 He proceeded to consider the one resolution of the Board that had been produced and concluded that, because the pursuer had been excluded from that meeting, it was invalid. The defenders' attack on the relevancy of this part of the pursuer's case therefore failed.
(2) Express Ratification
It is in this context that Bolton becomes relevant. In essence, the pursuer argued that he had validly resigned. It followed that his benefits would be intact, and he would not be treated as a "bad leaver". Having resigned, he could not later be dismissed by the Board. However, an invalid dismissal pre-dated his resignation. Ratification operates retrospectively, turning previously invalid acts lacking authority into valid ones. Thus, after ratification the invalid dismissal became valid, 'trumping' the resignation. Lord Bannatyne explained: "…the Board resolution although it comes after the resignation relates back to the dismissal and therefore this is to apply Bolton: "To have held the resolution ineffective would be to deprive it of its retrospective effect". 21 The pursuer therefore lost on this point.
Scottish courts have refused to allow ratification to take place where it would undermine a legally relevant time limit: Goodall v Bilsland. 22 Lord Bannatyne stated: "[i]n the instant case there is no time fixed by agreement or by other means of a type identified above for doing the act, namely: dismissal for gross misconduct, which would be extended by finding the express ratification ineffective".
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In relation to the second agency point, the pursuer argued that ratification would cause him prejudice, relying on an English Court of Appeal case from 2003, The
Borvigilant. 24 Essentially, Lord Bannatyne was persuaded that ratification would have been unfairly prejudicial to the pursuer on the facts of the case. In order to reach his decision on this point, he relied on a number of factors. 25 The defenders could have expressly ratified, and they failed to do so for a significant length of time. Because they did not expressly ratify, the pursuer proceeded to act in a certain way, namely to raise proceedings. He would not have done this had there been express ratification at an earlier stage. Express ratification would, Lord Doherty held, be unfairly prejudicial. Overall, Mr Gray's action was held to be incompetent on grounds not discussed here. Lord Bannatyne stated that, had he been with Mr Gray on competency, Mr Gray's case on ratification would have passed the test of relevancy.
D. CONCLUSIONS
In relation to the first agency issue, there is now clarity: Bolton is authoritative in Scots law.
There is no indication from the case report that the controversy surrounding Bolton was aired in court. It may have been: it is impossible for those not present in the court that day to tell. If the controversy was not discussed in Gray, this is unsatisfactory. It is, of course, difficult for a court to consider theoretical arguments on a point of agency law. Taken together, Lord Bannatyne's decisions on the two agency points are welcome.
Nor is it surprising to see a Scottish court apply an English Court of Appeal precedent in this way. It is concerning, however, to see the court apparently unaware that the English case in question (Bolton) has been subject to criticism throughout the common law world. Issues of principle should be discussed when important decisions on the future direction of Scots law are made. Whilst the outcome is a good one in this context, that may not always be the case.
Some English agency solutions or remedies will be shaped by the law of equity, or by the doctrine of consideration. Those solutions are not likely to be suitable for Scots law. Only by considering a broader range of sources, including those from outside the UK, are we likely to forge fair and useful solutions for Scottish agency problems. 
Laura J Macgregor
University of Edinburgh
